The point that Quintilian never stopped pushing is that the orator, above all things, must be a good man, and only then can he speak well. Although Quintilian does believe that men can be born good, he also means that the man must study virtue. Virtue in his time was very cut and dry. There were very certain characteristics that were considered virtuous, which were decided among the philosophers of the time. Back then, people openly believed that there were certain things that were right or wrong, and men could learn them form teachers.
There is no doubt that times have changed dramatically. I don't think that people care about being good men anymore. Relativism is widely accepted philosophy in this world of growing tolerance. A lot of people think that what is right for me might not be right for you, that we are different, and that therefore, morally right and morally wrong mean different things for each individual. I think it's bogus. It's an excuse to act like animals.
I've been contemplating on what the world would look like if all of our politicians were good men. If they never lied, if they never had hidden agendas, if they cared more about the people they govern than they care about themselves. If they cared about hunger more than they care about their next pay raise. If they cared more about the common health than undeserved bail-outs. It looks like a pretty awesome place huh?
For these reasons, I think Quintilian was right about the good men. It's too bad that most people are easily fooled by the speeches of bad men. I think rhetoric was meant for a higher purpose than deceiving. However, that seems to be its chief use in the world of politics today.
The problem I have with Quintillian and his definite set of 'virtues' is the same problem I have with other rhetoricians we have studied looking for an 'ultimate truth'. And I fall on the opposite side of the spectrum from you--how can we have an ultimate definition of virtue or truth? I bet if we asked for a definition in class we would have twenty or so different definitions. I don't think any definition would be better or more closer to 'Truth' than any other, but each would be different and right for the specific person.
ReplyDeleteThe question of virtue and truth also brings up the question if a truly 'virtuous man' is even possible. Human history would seem to suggest otherwise--our history is a history of conflict. Perhaps it is something we can aspire to, but never completely achieve? If we accept this as true (and I know its a bit of stretch, and can definitely be argued), it seems that using rhetoric for persuasive purposes becomes necessary, and not necessarily 'non-virtuous'.
It's much easier to come up with a list of things that are virtuous than to try to define virtuous. I bet if our class decided to list certain virtues or virtuous acts, that there wouldn't be very many in which we anyone was I disagreement with. I don't think we would find a whole lot of people in our class who would disagree that the following are virtuous.
ReplyDelete1. honesty
2. responsibility/accountability
3. selfless service
4. faithfulness/ loyalty
I could go on and on. I think humans know what is virtuous and what is not virtuous, because it makes most of feel like shit when we act against our morals. Only sociopaths/psychopaths are the exception. The problem with this world is that fewer and fewer people care about being virtuous. They use disagreement upon what is virtuous as an excuse to act like assholes.
Who in our class wants to argue that dishonesty is virtuous? The first argument that would probably arise is that there are certain times when lies must be told, in order to prevent a greater evil. But I'm not talking about special circumstances. I'm speaking in general terms. Should we go through our lives being mostly honest or mostly dishonest? The same could be asked with any number of virtues.
Why do you think the feeling of guilt exists? Because we don't really know what is right and wrong? That's preposterous.
Virtues are pretty self evident when you cut the crap.