The "Rules of Rhetoric" equate to eloquence/oratory,
which Augustine refuses to discuss in the beginning of Book IV but then
proceeds to only discuss. "I wish to put down the hopes of readers who...
think that I am going to set forth the rules of rhetoric..." (p.456, Ch.
2) he says, but then speaks for thirty(ish) pages about the roles of eloquence
(in either abundance or in lack and when and how and for what purpose to choose
which) in Christian oratory. Eloquence, he defines as "adroit oral practice
in the use of a large vocabulary and rich diction...". Along with
this definition of eloquence, he states "...result in what we term
eloquence, or oratory" or, that eloquence and oratory are two terms for
the same thing (p.457, Ch. 4). Notice how, as an instruction, this definition
utilizes what he terms the "low style" of oratory.
So, at this point, what happens if we read the rest of Book IV
remembering that when he refers to eloquence, he refers to oratory as a whole?
Up to this point in our readings, I have taken eloquence to be apart from, or a
part of oratory (and writing, of course). With this connection, however,
oratory (and writing, of course) becomes eloquence. A problem arises when we
consider his instructional voice in the plain style, which seems to be
intentionally devoid of eloquence. We can answer this by looking at eloquence
as a measurable thing. That is, a lack of eloquence is a measure of eloquence.
He further urges that eloquence of the Christian orator
(writer) exists not only in his/her words, but in his/her acts, and that
living a good life is eloquent, even if the speech lacks eloquence of form, or
that, “he should prefer to please through his matter rather than through his
words”(p. 483 Ch.61). To the other extreme, eloquence is acceptable as a means
of persuasion, even if the speaker is evil, provided that the words are Truth
(p. 482 Ch. 59). Does this view of extremities invalidate ethos as a necessary
in Christian oratory?
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