There was a topic that Whately brings up which seemed to me quite revolutionary. This was his notion of paradoxes in the construction of arguments. What I like about this idea is the notion that when we first come into contact with something, and later recount it, it is this need, against the better judgement of the author, to tell the truth. Even if this truth flies in the face of the ideal truth of the time, the author writes it because their concept of truth has been flipped on its axis. This "new" truth is then more believable because it converges with the ideal truth at the time. Whately supports this idea by saying, "Anything which, however likely to take place, would not have been likely, otherwise, to enter the mind of those particular persons who attest to it, or would be at variance with their interest or prejudices, is thereby rendered the more credible" (1017).
Whately then brings up the disciples recounting of Jesus and the records of his miracles. He says that the fact they record these occurrences, "at variance with all the prejudices, of any man living in those days, and of Jews more especially, this is a strong confirmation of their testimony" (1016). I could ask how does something that fits so far out of the ideal truth of the time be seen as more true? It seems that what is universally held to be true is a fairly good conception of the truth. It has been supported throughout history and by social standards. Everyone else seems to agree it. But when this new truth comes into play, and questions this universal truth, Whately says it should be considered true as well, or overrides a preexisting notion of truth.
Now, I can imagine a few nuts out there who would love to agree with Whately here. The idea that because a truth is new, and contrasts with an existing truth, especially when that person insists that their truth is real, seems a little broad of a definition. What Whately goes on to say is that this person must then show his proofs, such as Jesus did with his miracles and statements. If Christianity is ever going to be repelled, Whately argues, that, "the burden of proof, now, lies plainly on him who rejects the Gospel; which, if it were not established by mircales, demands an explanation of the greater miracle--its having been established, in defiance of all opposition, by human contrivance" (1020).
I think it is interesting the notion of recounting, as it applies to the rhetorical notion of memory. The manipulation of truth based on memory is intriguing, and I wonder how it could be applied in how we study history. Although the details of the memory, such as the smell and colors, might not be as easy to recall a second time the abstract thought feeling and purpose behind the scene is what creates a new "truth." Looking seasonally at the "First Thanksgiving" it is impossible to remember the sounds and the exact language that was used, but we have a better understanding of the social and contextual, racist, situation that was happening at that time, after years of reflection through self reflection. Does this make the truth more real or less? Is memory then changed based on the construction of society and the changing of social norms? If something is contingent on social structure, that seems a bit unstable. How does this argue against any notions of Truth?
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